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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Southern District of California has experienced the same 
proliferation of local rules that has afflicted many federal district courts 
throughout the nation. 1 Typical of other district courts, the Southern 
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School. The author gained many of the insights that form the basis of this Article while 
serving as the Southern District reviewer for the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's 
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Circuit Judicial Council nor the Committee to Review Local District Rules. Special 
thanks to Beth A. Knisely for her research efforts, as well as to Margaret Z. Johns and 
Kevin Cole for their helpful suggestions. 
1. The 1989 report of the Local Rules Project documented the tremendous 
increase in promulgation of local rules by federal district courts nationwide. See 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL 
PRACTICE ( I 989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT]. See also Daniel 
R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. I 989, at 62 (summarizing 
Local Rules Project report); infra notes I 6-2 I and accompanying text. Several scholars 
have analyzed the reasons for, as well as the consequences of, this proliferation of local 
procedures. See, e.g., Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation 
in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (I 992); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform 
and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992) 
[hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization]; Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules. Local Rules, and 
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District has promulgated local rules after some opportunity for comment 
from the local federal bar,2 but has imposed the rules without external 
scrutiny or other meaningful review. The Southern District has approxi-
mately eighty separate local rules, many with multiple subparts, which 
fill fifty pages of double-column fine print.3 In addition, 435 or so 
"General Orders"-many the functional equivalent of local 
rules--announce policies and procedures for the district court. This 
proliferation of procedural rules means that a Southern District 
practitioner seeking an answer to a procedural question faces a more 
complicated task than merely consulting the relevant federal rules and 
federal statutes; counsel must also determine whether any local rules and 
general orders control. 
The task becomes even more challenging when the local and federal 
rules are inconsistent. Despite the directive of 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and 
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that local rules be 
consistent with the federal rules and federal statutes, many of the 
Southern District's local rules conflict with federal law.4 Other local 
rules may not conflict, but duplicate the analogous federal rule by 
repeating it with slightly different language. 
The Committee to Review Local District Rules, a newly constituted 
task force under the auspices of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, is 
currently undertaking a comprehensive review of all local rules of the 
district courts within the Ninth Circuit. The charge of this ad hoc 
committee is to identify local rules in each district that are inconsistent 
with, or duplicative of, the federal rules or the United States Code. 
Through this task force review process, the Ninth Circuit Judicial 
State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1999 ( 1989). 
Professor Carl Tobias attributes the recent proliferation of local district court 
rules--which he decries as the "balkanization" of a once uniform and simple national 
rule system----to a variety off actors, the most significant of which has been the perceived 
explosion of litigation and litigation abuses since the mid-1970s. See Tobias, 
Balkanization, supra, at 1396. The federal trial courts responded to this perceived 
explosion by actively employing numerous local practices (for example, discovery 
limitations, pretrial conferences, alternative dispute resolution, and sanctions) designed 
to expedite dispute resolution and to prevent or remedy abuses. Id. at 1396-1406. The 
primary means by which the district courts sought to achieve this goal of managerial 
judging was through promulgation of local rules. Id. at 1397-99. See generally infra 
notes 14-16, 29-34 and accompanying text. 
2. A 1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 207l(b)(l994) requires the district court to 
give public notice of proposed local rules and an opportunity for comment on them prior 
to adoption. FED. R. CIV. P. 83, as amended in 1985, contains similar requirements. 
3. By comparison, publication of all 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in the same format would require approximately 45 pages. 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
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Council hopes to implement the oversight responsibilities imposed on it 
by the Judicial Improvements Acts and by Federal Rule 83.5 The 
Committee anticipates submission of a final report in Spring 1997. 
This Article contains an overview of some conflicts with and 
duplication of federal laws apparent in the current local rules of the 
Southern District and concludes with some curative suggestions for the 
district court and for the Ninth Circuit. The forthcoming report of the 
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's Committee to Review Local District 
Rules will contain more detailed analyses and recommendations with 
respect to these and other local rules. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LOCAL RULES REVIEW PROCESS 
A. The Phenomenon of Local Rules Proliferation 
Local federal rules have existed in one form or another since the 
creation of federal trial courts in 1789.6 Prior to the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), federal statutes already 
authorized the district courts to make local rules not inconsistent with 
federal law.7 The Rules Enabling Act of 19348 carried forward this au-
thority to make local rules not inconsistent with the Federal Rules, as did 
the original version of Federal Rule 83. The new scheme of national 
uniform rules embodied in the 1938 Federal Rules, therefore, appreciated 
the practical need for local rules to fill in gaps in the Federal Rules and 
to respond to local conditions.9 Soon after the Federal Rules became 
5. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 364-365 (1995) (swnmarizing the Ninth Circuit's efforts 
at local rules review) [hereinafter Tobias, Suggestions]. 
6. See Jack B. Weinstein, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 117 
(1977); Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1253-
1254 (1967) [hereinafter Local Federal Rules]; Subrin, supra note I, at 2012. 
7. E.g., Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, I Stat. 335; 28 U.S.C. § 731 (1873) 
(originally enacted as Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6); Equity Rule 79,226 U.S. 673 
(1912). See Local Federal Rules, supra note 6, at 1253-1254 (summarizing statutory 
authority for local rules before 1938); Subrin, supra note I, at 2012 (summarizing 
district court local rulemaking power from 1789 until the Conformity Act of I 872, and 
from I 872 until the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 ). 
8. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(current version codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2071-2077 (1994)). 
9. See Subrin, supra note I, at 2013. 
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effective, the Judicial Conference of the United States, 10 the policy-
making arm of the federal courts, recognized the need to review then-
existing local rules for compliance with the new national rules. The 
Judicial Conference appointed a committee, which became known as the 
Knox committee, to review local rules for the purpose of developing 
recommendations to achieve a greater degree of simplicity and uniformi-
ty.11 After a comprehensive survey, the 1940 Knox committee report 
found that several district courts had local rules that repeated or con-
flicted with the Federal Rules and made appropriate recommendations. 12 
For the next several decades, the federal trial courts seemed satisfied 
with the procedural scheme of uniform national rules and limited local 
variations. 13 
Beginning in the mid- l 970s, however, federal judges became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the Federal Rules, which they perceived as 
fostering an explosion of litigation and litigation abuses in the federal 
courts. 14 This dissatisfaction gave rise to new efforts by federal judges 
to more actively manage the conduct of civil litigation, which, in tum, 
led to their increasing reliance on local rules and procedures. 15 The 
I 0. The Judicial Conference of the United States consists of the Chief Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the chief judge of each judicial circuit and of the Court of 
International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 331 
( 1988). The Conference possesses a variety of responsibilities with respect to 
improvement of the administration of justice in the federal courts including the duty to 
make comprehensive surveys of the condition of business in the federal courts, to submit 
recommendations to the various courts to promote uniformity of management procedures 
and the expeditious conduct of court business, and to study and make recommendations 
to the Supreme Court with respect to the Federal Rules. Id. The Judicial Conference 
also has the power to review local rules of the courts of appeals for consistency with 
federal law, and to modify or abrogate any such circuit rule found inconsistent. Id. The 
Judicial Conference does not have any similar direct authority to review local rules of 
the district courts. Id. 
11. See Subrin, supra note I, at 20 I 6. 
12. See REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL 
DISTRICT COURT RULES (1940). See generally Subrin, supra note I, at 2016-19 
(discussing the Knox committee report). 
13. See Subrin, supra note I, at 2017-18. This historical overview of local rules 
review draws substantially from the various works of several scholars, but particularly 
those of Professor Carl Tobias whose extensive writings on the proliferation of local 
rules and on the Judicial Improvements Acts illuminate the problems associated with the 
attempts at local rules oversight. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 
U. PITT. L. REV. 801, 814-831 (1995); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 
Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1592-93 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, 
Improving the Acts]; Tobias, Balkanization, supra note I, at 1393-1413; Tobias, 
Suggestions, supra note 5, at 359-367. 
14. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1593-99; Tobias, 
Balkanization, supra note I, at 1395-99; Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, supra note 
13, at 810-12. 
15. See sources cited supra note 14. 
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growth in district court local rules continued during the 198Os and 199Os 
with a resultant decline in the uniformity, simplicity, and trans-
substantivity of federal procedure envisioned by the Federal Rules. 16 
During the 198Os, the Judicial Conference became increasingly 
concerned with the proliferation of local rules by the various district 
courts. 17 The Conference was particularly troubled by those local 
procedural requirements that appeared to conflict with the Federal Rules 
or with sections of the United States Code. In 1986, the Conference 
commissioned the Local Rules Project to systematically review all local 
rules and procedures, to identify problems associated with local rules 
proliferation, and to make recommendations to resolve these prob-
lems.18 The Local Rules Project published its findings and recommen-
dations in a 1989 report entitled Report of the Local Rules Project: 
Local Rules on Civil Practice. 19 This report not only verified the 
suspected proliferation of local rules,20 but also identified widespread 
instances of their possible inconsistencies with, and repetition of, federal 
rules or statutes.21 Based on this report, the Judicial Conference re-
quested all district courts to conform their local procedures to the 
Federal Rules.22 For a variety of reasons, few courts have complied.23 
16. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1598-1622; Tobias, 
Balkanization, supra note I, at 1397-1403. 
17. See Coquillette et. al., supra note I, at 65; Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra 
note 13, at 1596-97; Tobias, Balkanization, supra note I, at 1398-99. 
18. See Subrin, supra note 1, at 2019-20. 
19. REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 1. 
20. The Report of the Local Rules Project observed: 
The ninety-four district courts currently have an aggregate of approximately 
5,000 local rules, not including many "sub-rules," standing orders and standard 
operating procedures. These rules are extraordinarily diverse and their 
numbers continue to grow rapidly. To give one stark example, the Central 
District of California, based in Los Angeles, has about thirty-one local rules 
with 434 "sub-rules," supplemented by approximately 275 standing orders. At 
the other extreme, the Middle District of Georgia has only one local rule and 
just one standing order. These local rules literally cover the entire spectrum 
of federal practice, from attorney admission and attorney discipline, through 
the various stages of trial, including pleading and filing requirements, pre-trial 
discovery procedures, and taxation of costs. 
REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1. 
21. See Subrin, supra note I, at 2021-26. 
22. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1597. 
23. Id. Some of the reasons for the district courts' failure to comply are discussed 
infra note 99. 
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Congress also focused its attention on the problems associated with 
local rules proliferation specifically, and with civil litigation generally, 
and passed two pieces of remedial legislation at the end of the 1980s: 
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (Judicial 
Improvements Act)24 and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
(CJRA).25 Unfortunately, these two Acts represent largely incompatible 
views with respect to local rules and have greatly complicated current 
efforts toward local rules review. 
By enacting the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act, Congress sought to 
reverse the proliferation of local rules and restore the primacy of the 
uniform Federal Rules.26 The 1988 Act requires each district court to 
appoint a local rules committee to advise the court with respect to 
formulation of local rules, and to provide public notice and opportunity 
for comment prior to adoption of local rules.27 More significantly, the 
Act requires each circuit judicial council to periodically review all local 
rules for consistency with the Federal Rules and empowers each council 
to "modify or abrogate any such [local] rule found inconsistent in the 
course of such a review. "28 
Two years later, Congress turned its attention to very different 
concerns with the civil justice system: the perceived problems of 
litigation abuses, increased costs, and lengthening delays in federal civil 
litigation. After considering recommendations for improvement-mostly 
reforms relating to litigation management, judicial monitoring of 
discovery, and alternative dispute resolution-----Congress passed the CJRA 
in 1990.29 The CJRA required each of the ninety-four federal district 
courts to adopt an individualized civil justice and delay reduction plan 
by December 1993.30 The CJRA directed each district to appoint an 
advisory group consisting of local attorneys, client representatives, and 
the U.S Attorney to help formulate a plan based on the particular needs 
and circumstances of the district.31 The advisory group was instructed 
to review the court's docket, evaluate the reasons for the district's civil 
24. Title IV of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 
2071-2074 (1994)). 
25. Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 
Stat. 5090 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)). 
26. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note I 3, at I 623-27. 
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077(b)(I994). 
28. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4)(1988). 
29. The legislative background of the CJRA is discussed in detail in Mullenix, 
supra note I, and in Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1601-04. 
30. 28 u.s.c. § 471 (1994). 
31. 28 u.s.c. §§ 472,478 (1994). 
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litigation delays, and recommend cost and delay reduction measures.32 
The district court must develop an expense and delay reduction plan 
after considering the advisory group's recommendations, litigation 
management principles, and the cost and delay reduction techniques set 
forth in the CJRA.33 The CJRA also created committees to monitor 
and assess the plans. 34 
These two Acts are at cross-purposes. The Judicial Improvements 
Act's purpose is to rein in local rules, remove conflicts, and restore 
uniformity; the CJRA's goal is to reduce costs and delays by improved 
judicial case management.35 To accomplish the latter goal, the CJRA 
encouraged federal district courts to experiment with local procedures 
and rules.36 Not only did the CJRA invite each district to expand its 
local rules, but, by implication, authorized each district to promulgate 
local rules that may conflict with the Federal Rules.37 The CJRA of 
1990 altered the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act's directive to each 
circuit judicial council as to local rule oversight and, more significantly, 
effectively suspended efforts to implement the earlier Act's mandate to 
limit local rules.38 
More recently, an unexpected source has further complicated the local 
rules review process. The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure sanction local variations from the Federal Rules 
themselves, although on a more limited basis than the CJRA. Most 
notably, new Federal Rule 26 permits each district court to opt out of the 
automatic disclosures, quantity limitations, and certain other discovery 
requirements imposed by the 1993 amendments.39 
32. 28 u.s.c. §§ 472-473, 478 (1994). 
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 472(a), 473(a),(b)(1994). 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 474(a),(b)(I994). 
35. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1623-27. 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6)(1994)(authorizing the district court to include various 
specified litigation management and delay reduction techniques, including "such other 
features as the district court considers appropriate after considering the recommendations 
of the advisory group"). 
37. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1620; Robel, supra note I, 
at 1467-70. 
38. See Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1623-27; Tobias, More 
Modern Civil Process, supra note 13, at 819, 824-26. 
39. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(I) (authorizing local rules that exempt litigants from 
compliance with various automatic initial disclosures); id. 26(b)(2) (authorizing district 
courts to alter the numerical limits imposed on depositions and interrogatories, and the 
length limits imposed on depositions and requests for admission); id. 26(d) (authorizing 
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The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council directed its Local Rules Review 
Committee to exclude from review those local rules adopted by the dis-
trict courts under the authority of the CJRA or the 1993 Federal Rule 
amendments.40 Likewise, this Article does not discuss several local 
rules adopted pursuant to the Southern District's Delay and Cost 
Reduction Plan under the CJRA,41 nor those local discovery rules 
adopted pursuant to the Southern District's standing order opting out of 
some of the 1993 amendments to Federal Rules on discovery.42 The 
CJRA is scheduled to sunset in December 1997.43 If Congress does 
permit the CJRA to expire at that time, the Southern District may then 
need to modify the local rules implementing its CJRA plan to conform 
once again to the Federal Rules.44 
local rules that except parties from certain limitations on the timing and sequence of 
discovery); id. 26(f) (authorizing local rules that exempt parties from a required meeting 
to discuss case and develop proposed discovery plan). 
40. See Memorandum from Margaret Z. Johns, Chair, Local Rules Review 
Committee, to Local Rules Reviewers, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1995) (on file with author). 
41. The Southern District's Delay and Cost Reduction Plan was adopted by 
General Order No. 394 on June 3, I 992, with occasional amendments thereafter. E.g., 
General Order No. 394, In the Matter of the Delay and Cost Reduction Plan Under the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 1992); General Order No. 394-E, 
General Order Regarding Proposed Modification to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, I 993); General Order No. 394-1, General Order Regarding Proposed 
Modification to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1995). The 
Plan authorizes an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference and a Case Management 
Conference to supervise discovery, encourage settlement, explore arbitration and other 
alternative dispute resolutions, and otherwise manage pretrial proceedings. See S.D. 
CAL. R. 16.l(c)-(e), 16.2, 16.3, 37.1. The Plan also contains specific time restric-
tions---which often conflict with the Federal Rules---for service of process, extensions, 
default judgments, and summary judgment motions. See S.D. CAL. R. 4.l(a),(b), 12.1, 
16.3(n)(l)-(6), 55.1. 
42. Pursuant to General Order No. 394-1, the Southern District has ordered that 
compliance with the following 1993 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not required: 
Federal Rules 26(a)(l)-(4) (pretrial disclosures), 26(f) (meeting of parties regarding 
discovery), 30(a)(2)(A)&(C)(limits on oral depositions), and 33(a), 34(b), and 46(a)(inso-
far as these rules require leave of court or stipulation for serving interrogatories, 
document production requests, and requests for admissions). General Order No. 394-1, 
supra note 41. This General Order is codified in several local rules. See S.D. CAL. R. 
26.I(f), 30.I(d), 33.I(d), 36.I(d), 34.l(a). 
43. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § I03(b)(2), 104 
Stat. 5089 (1990). 
44. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at 368 ("Should Congress permit the 
CJRA to sunset as scheduled in I 997, the conflicting [local] procedures adopted under 
the CJRA ought to sunset as well.") (footnote omitted). 
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B. Statutory Prescriptions Regarding Local Rules and Local Rules 
Review 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2071 authorizes individual federal district courts to 
adopt local rules, but mandates that such rules "be consistent with" the 
Federal Rules and federal statutes and be "prescribed only after giving 
appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment."45 Like-
wise, Federal Rule 83 authorizes each district court to make and amend 
rules "not inconsistent with these [Federal Rules]." In addition, Federal 
Rule 83 provides: "A local rule must be consistent with---but not 
duplicative of-Acts of Congress and [the Federal Rules]."46 
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 requires each circuit judicial 
council to periodically review local rules adopted by district courts for 
consistency with national rules.47 In the Ninth Circuit, the Judicial 
Council delegated this responsibility to the Conference of Chief District 
Judges, a creation of the Judicial Council.48 The Chair of this Confer-
ence, Chief Judge Robert Coyle of the Eastern District of California, 
appointed a Committee to Review Local District Rules to carry out this 
charge.49 The membership of this Committee includes three district 
court chief judges, a clerk of the court, two law professors, and 
representatives of the federal bar. In addition, several law professors 
serve as volunteer local reviewers. In anticipation of the amendment to 
Federal Rule 83, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council expanded the scope 
of the Committee to include review of local rules that are duplicative of 
national rules. 50 However, as discussed above, the Judicial Council 
excluded as outside the scope of the Committee's review (1) local rules 
promulgated by a district court pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 207l(a),(b) (1994). 
46. FED. R. C1v. P. 83 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the 1995 amendment to 
Federal Rule 83 does not define what it means by "duplicative" or "consistent" rule, 
leaving considerable room for legitimate debate. 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4)(1994). 
48. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at 365. 
49. Id. 
50. See Memorandum from Margaret Z. Johns, Chair, Local Rules Review 
Committee, to Local Rules Reviewers, at 2 (May 26, 1995) (on file with author). 
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of 1990 (CJRA) and (2) local rules promulgated to implement, suspend, 
or modify the 1993 amendments of the Federal Rules.51 
The Committee to Review Local District Rules anticipates submission 
of a final report to the Conference of Chief District Judges in Spring 
1997. The Judical Improvements Act of 1988 empowers each circuit 
judicial council, in the course of its review process, to modify or 
abrogate any district court local rules within the circuit found to be 
inconsistent with federal rules or statutes.52 Whether and to what 
extent the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council will exercise this power with 
respect to inconsistent local rules, including those of the Southern 
District, remain to be seen. 
The remainder of this Article discusses some preliminary findings with 
respect to the local rules of the Southern District of California as well 
as some suggestions for the district court and the Ninth Circuit Judicial 
Council with respect to local rules review. 
III. LOCAL RULES THAT CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW 
A. "Unintentional" Conflicts 
Many of the Southern District of California Rules (Local Rules) 
conflict with provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal 
Rules).53 Some of these conflicts may simply reflect an inadvertent 
failure to conform the local rule to an amendment to the Federal Rules. 
In these cases, the conflict may be unintentional. Local Rule 48.1, for 
example, provides: "In all civil actions in which a party is entitled to a 
jury trial, the jury shall consist of six members and such alternates as the 
judge may determine."54 The 1991 amendments to Federal Rules 47 
and 48, however, abolished the institution of the alternate juror.55 
51. See Memorandum from Margaret Z. Johns, Chair, Local Rules Review 
Committee, to Local Rules Reviewers, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1995) (on file with author). 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4)(1994). 
53. The Committee's review of local rules is not limited to conflicts with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also includes inconsistencies with federal statutes 
and with other federal rules such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Sup-
plemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, the Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States 
District Courts, and the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases in the United States 
District Courts. This part of the Article surveys conflicts between the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Southern District's civil rules because these conflicts are the 
most significant and numerous. 
54. S.D. CAL. R. 48.1 (effective Dec. 2, 1991). 
55. The provision for alternate jurors in former Federal Rule 47 was stricken, and 
the institution of the alternate juror was abolished, by the 1991 amendments. See FED. 
R. C1v. P. 47 advisory committee's notes (1991 amendment). The reason for this 
564 
[VOL. 33: 555, 1996] Review of Local Rules 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Although the Southern District's actual practice undoubtedly complies 
with current Federal Rules 47 and 48, the district court neglected to 
revise Local Rule 48.1 to conform to the 1991 amendments. 
Likewise, at numerous points the Southern District's local rules 
instruct the clerk not to accept for filing any document which does not 
comply with the various form requirements imposed by the Local 
Rules.56 Such a delegation of authority may have been appropriate 
when these local rule provisions were first adopted, but no longer. 
Federal Rule 5(e), as amended in 1991, provides: "The clerk shall not 
refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely 
because it is not presented in the proper form as required by these rules 
abolition, according to the Advisory Committee, was: "The use of alternate jurors has 
been a source of dissatisfaction with the jury system because of the burden it places on 
alternates who are required to listen to the evidence but denied the satisfaction of 
participating in its evaluation." Id. Because the institution of the alternate juror has 
been abolished, the Advisory Committee also advised that it will ordinarily be prudent 
and necessary in civil actions, in order to provide for sickness or disability among jurors, 
to seat more than the constitutionally permissible minimum of six jurors. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 48 advisory committee's notes (1991 amendment). This advice also calls into 
question the continued propriety of Local Rule 48.1 's directive that juries in civil actions 
consist of only six members. See S.D. CAL. R. 48.1. 
56. Local Rule 5. l(t) provides: "Unless a waiver is first obtained from the court, 
the clerk shall not file any document which does not comply with the requirements of 
these rules. Said document will be endorsed 'lodged' until approved by the court." 
S.D. CAL. R. 5. l(t). Several other rules contain similar instructions to the clerk with 
respect to specified nonconforming documents. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. l.l(d)(l3) 
(defining "file" to mean acceptance by the clerk of a document), 5. l(g) (authorizing clerk 
to refuse to accept for filing any pleading unless entitled an adversary proceeding 
naming the defendant), 9.3(a) (authorizing clerk to return nonconforming habeas corpus 
petition), 15.1 (declaring that no pleading shall be deemed amended until amendment 
complies with local rules). 
The Southern District has recently amended two other rules, Local Rules 4.2 and 
9.4(a), that had contained such instructions to the clerk. Effective July 15, 1996, Local 
Rule 9.4(a) no longer provides that the clerk "shall" return complaints by prisoners under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) which do not comply with the form requirements specified in 
the rule, but now provides that the clerk "may" return such noncomplying complaints 
when tendered to the clerk for filing. S.D. CAL. R. 9.4(a). The amendment to Local 
Rule 4.2 deleted the instruction to the clerk to return any action, sought to be filed in 
forma pauperis, which was not accompanied by a supporting declaration that complied 
with the numerous content requirements of that rule. S.D. CAL. R. 4.2. Local Rule 4.2 
as amended still requires that the declaration in support of a request to proceed in forma 
pauperis shall contain numerous specified statements; and, presumably, the clerk still has 
the authority under Local Rule 5.1 (g) to not file any declaration that fails to comply with 
the requirements of Local Rule 4.2. 
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or any local rules or practices."57 The Advisory Committee's Note to 
Federal Rule 5(e) explains that the refusal to accept for filing noncon-
forming papers is not a suitable role for the office of the clerk, and that 
local rules allowing such refusals are proscribed. 58 These various local 
provisions instructing the clerk not to accept nonconforming papers 
obviously conflict with Federal Rule 5(e) and should be rescinded by the 
district court. 
B. "Intentional" Conflicts 
1. Fact Pleading and the RICO Case Statement 
Other inconsistencies cannot be characterized as mere inadvertent 
failures to keep current with Federal Rule amendments. For example, 
three Southern District local rules require "fact pleading" in circum-
stances where the Federal Rules do not require such a heightened 
pleading standard.59 The most significant is Local Rule 11.1, which 
requires any plaintiff bringing a civil action under the federal Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)60 to file, within thirty 
days of filing the complaint, a "RICO Case Statement," which the court 
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e). 
58. The Advisory Committee offered the following additional explanation for this 
I 99 I amendment: "The enforcement of these rules and of local rules is a role for a 
judicial officer. A clerk may of course advise a party or counsel that a particular instru-
ment is not in proper form, and may be directed to so inform the court." FED. R. CIV. 
P. 5(e) advisory committee's note (1991 amendment). 
59. Local Rule 3.2(a) requires each complaint to state the "facts supporting ... 
jurisdiction." S.D. CAL. R. 3.2(a). Local Rule 23.l(b)(2) requires a pleading alleging 
a class action to contain a "statement of facts showing that the party is entitled to 
maintain the action under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 23 F. R. Civ. P." S.D. CAL. 
R. 23.l(b)(2). Local Rule I I.I requires plaintiffs in civil RICO actions to file a "RICO 
Case Statement" which states in detail the specific factual information requested in that 
form. S.D. CAL. R. I I.I. 
60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). The RICO statutes authorize a private cause 
of action for treble damages, plus attorneys fees, for any person injured in his business 
or property by reason of a "pattern of racketeering activity" or collection of an unlawful 
debt. Id.§§ 1962, 1964(c). A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires the commission 
of two or more predicate acts of"racketeering activity" within ten years. Id. § 1961(5). 
"Racketeering activity," as defined by RICO, includes "any act or threat involving 
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene 
matter, or dealing in a controlled substance" chargeable under state law; or any act 
indictable under several provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code, including 
bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate shipping, embezzlement from pension funds, 
mail and wire fraud, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, illegal gambling business, 
money laundering, interstate transportation of stolen property, obscene matter, and sexual 
exploitation of children. Id. § 1961 (I). 
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shalt construe as an amendment to the pleadings.61 This mandatory 
case statement contains twenty separate requests, some with numerous 
subparts, for detailed information about the factual bases for the civil 
RICO claims.62 These detailed requests must be answered with 
specificity; failure to file a detailed case statement which responds to 
these requests with the required specificity will subject the RICO claims 
to dismissal. 63 
61. When the Southern District adopted the RICO Case Statement requirement by 
a general order in January, 1992, it explained that civil RICO claims "tend to expand the 
scope of a given case, increase discovery, lead to numerous time-consuming and costly 
motions to dismiss, and prevent possible settlement of litigation. This order is not 
intended to minimize valid claims of to render their prosecution more difficult." General 
Order No. 386 Revised, Civil RICO Actions Filed in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of California Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1992). 
The RICO Case Statement requirement was not, however, adopted as part of the 
Southern District's CJRA Delay and Cost Reduction Plan. See General Order No. 394. 
supra note 41. 
62. The RICO Case Statement requires the civil RICO claimant to provide detailed 
information about such matters as the defendants and their alleged misconduct and the 
basis of liability of each defendant, the alleged victims and their injuries, the pattern of 
racketeering activities, the enterprise, the relationship between the enterprise and the 
volunteering activity, the effect on interstate commerce, the causal relationship between 
the alleged injuries and the violation of the RICO statute, and "any additional 
information that you feel would be helpful to the court in processing your RICO claims." 
General Order No. 394, supra note 41. The detailed factual information requested in 
paragraph 5 of the RICO Case Statement, reproduced infra note 67, exemplifies the 
kinds of information sought in the remainder of the Case Statement. 
63. S.D. CAL. R. 11.l(b). The Southern District is not alone in requiring detailed 
fact pleading as a means of judicially managing civil RICO actions. See Richard L. 
Marcus, The R~ival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 460-462 (1986). The civil RICO litigation boom that began in the 
1980s caused many courts to impose specificity in pleading in order to facilitate 
dismissal or some other early disposition of RICO claims. Id. 
Other attempts to restrict civil RICO litigation have been more substantive in nature. 
For example, some circuits had construed the RICO Act to require a prior criminal 
conviction for a predicate act as a prerequisite to a civil RICO claim based on that 
activity, and others had required a distinct "racketeering injury" separate from the harm 
caused by the predicate act. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 488-
93 (1985) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court rejected these substantive limitations 
in Sedima because they were not supported by the language, the legislative history, nor 
the policy considerations of the RICO statutes. Id. The Supreme Court found such 
restrictions on civil RICO actions inconsistent with the express congressional admonition 
that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 498. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged the problems caused by the increased filings and novel 
uses of civil RICO actions, but concluded that such practical consequences did not 
justify a narrow construction of the statute. Id. at 499-500. 
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Because the RICO Case Statement mandates extensive and detailed 
"fact pleading," and not the liberal "notice pleading" envisioned by 
Federal Rule 8(a)(2), this local requirement conflicts with the Federal 
Rules.64 Presumably, the Southern District reasoned it had legal 
authority for the mandatory RICO Case Statement under Federal Rule 
9(b ), which requires in all averments of fraud that the "circumstances 
constituting fraud ... be stated with particularity."65 This heightened 
pleading standard for fraud claims does not, however, justify the 
Southern District's elaborate RICO Case Statement. The Ninth Circuit 
has repeatedly held that where the predicate act upon which the RICO 
claim is based is fraud, Federal Rule 9(b) applies and the pleader must 
allege with particularity the time, place, and specific content of the false 
representations as well as the identities and roles of the parties to the 
alleged fraudulent scheme.66 However, the Southern District's RICO 
Case Statement goes far beyond the particularity required by Federal 
Rule 9(b) and the Ninth Circuit precedent. Subparagraph 5(c) of the 
RICO Case Statement requests the specific factual information required 
by Federal Rule 9(b) and the Ninth Circuit cases.67 The remaining 
64. In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the Supreme Court reversed a district 
court decision requiring fact pleading as inconsistent with the notice pleading policy of 
Federal Rule 8(a). The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that plaintiffs' 
complaint was deficient because it failed to set forth specific facts to support its general 
allegations of race discrimination: 
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
require a claimant to set out in detail facts upon which he bases his claim. To 
the contrary, all the Rules require is a 'short and plain statement of the claim' 
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests. 
Id. at 47 (footnote omitted). 
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b ). 
66. See, e.g., Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 
F.2d 397, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992) (collecting cases 
that require specification of such facts relating to predicate act of mail fraud); Moore v. 
Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding 
dismissal of complaint alleging predicate acts of mail and securities fraud); Alan 
Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring 
complaint to specifically plead such facts when predicate acts alleged are mail and wire 
fraud). 
67. Paragraph 5(c) of the Southern District's RICO Case Statement is but one of 
seven subparts comprising paragraph 5. Paragraph 5, in its entirety, provides as follows: 
5. Describe in detail the pattern of racketeering activities or collection of 
unlawful debts alleged for each RICO claim. The description of the pattern 
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of racketeering shall include the following information: 
a. List the alleged predicate acts and the specific statutes that were 
allegedly violated; 
b. Provide the date of each predicate act, the participants in each 
predicate act, and a description of the facts constituting each predicate act; 
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nineteen paragraphs require additional detailed factual allegations, far 
beyond the type of specific factual averments of fraud required by 
Federal Rule 9(b) and the Ninth Circuit decisions.68 
Moreover, the "predicate act" upon which a RICO claim is based need 
not be one of fraud. "Racketeering activity" is defined by RICO as any 
act or threat involving a variety of crimes chargeable under state law or 
indictable under several provisions of Title 18 of the United States 
Code.69 Where the predicate act is not one of fraud, a civil RICO 
claim would not trigger the heightened pleading standards of Federal 
Rule 9(b).70 
The Supreme Court recently held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit71 that a federal court 
cannot impose a more demanding pleading standard on one category of 
claims as opposed to others unless expressly authorized to do so by 
Federal Rule 9(b). Consequently, because the RICO Case Statement 
requires particularity in pleading in instances not governed by Federal 
Rule 9(b ), Local Rule 11.1 violates the notice pleading requirements of 
c. If the RICO claim is based on the predicate offenses of wire fraud, 
mail fraud, or fraud in the sale of securities, the "circumstances constitut-
ing fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(b). Identify the time, place and substance of the alleged misrepresenta-
tions, and the identity of the persons to whom and by whom the alleged 
misrepresentations were made; 
d. State whether there has been a criminal conviction for violation of 
any predicate act; 
e. State whether civil litigation has resulted in a judgment with regard 
to any predicate act; 
f. Describe how the predicate act forms a "pattern of racketeering 
activity;" and 
g. State whether the alleged predicate acts relate to each other as part 
of a common plan. If so, describe the alleged relationship and common 
plan in detail. 
General Order No. 386-B Revised, supra note 61. 
68. See supra notes 62 and 67. 
69. See supra note 60 (discussing federal statutory provisions that define civil 
RICO claims). 
70. Because the lengthy and detailed RICO Case Statement is deemed an amended 
pleading by Local Rule 11. l(a), mandating its use may also conflict with the Federal 
Rules: "No technical forms of pleadings are required." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(I). 
71. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
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Federal Rule 8(a).72 Except for Paragraph 5(c), the Southern District 
should eliminate its RICO Case Statement pleading requirement. 
2. Sanctions for Noncompliance with Local Rules 
Another area of potential conflict between the Southern District's local 
rules and federal authority concerns the imposition of sanctions for 
noncompliance with the local rules. Local Rule 1.3(a) states: 
Failure of counsel or of any party to comply with these rules ... may be 
ground for imposition by the court of any and all sanctions authorized by statute 
or rule or within the inherent power or the court, including, without limitation, 
dismissal of any actions, entry of default, finding of contempt, imposition of 
monetary sanctions or attorneys' fees and costs, and lesser sanctions. 73 
The Local Rules Project concluded that a local rule such as Rule 
1.3(a) conflicts with the Federal Rules because it allows "the court to 
impose sanctions altering the outcome of a case for a technical 
violation."74 As those commentators recognized, while the district 
court may impose such sanctions for a local rule violation that prejudices 
the outcome of a case, the court may not impose claim-dispositive 
sanctions because of a technical error.75 In explaining that harsh 
sanctions should not be available for technical violations, the Local 
72. In Leatherman, the Supreme Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit rule that required 
a plaintiff's complaint to state with factual particularity the basis for any 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 civil rights claims against municipalities or other local government entities. The 
Supreme Court struck down the Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading standard as 
incompatible with the liberal system of notice pleading set up by Federal Rule 8(a)(2). 
Id. at 168-69. In the absence of an amendment to Federal Rules 8 and 9, the Supreme 
Court observed, federal trial courts "must rely on summary judgment and control of 
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later." Id. Leatherman 
instructs that, despite the laudable reasons that may have induced the Southern District 
to adopt Local Rule I I.I, the RICO Case Statement requirement is inconsistent with 
Federal Rules 8 and 9(b ). 
The Ninth Circuit has recently utilized the Leatherman reasoning to strike down 
heightened pleading standards previously imposed by district courts on complaints 
alleging constitutional torts by government officials, where the subjective intent of the 
defendants was not an element of the plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Housley v. United 
States, 35 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1994); Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14 
F.3d 457,462 (9th Cir. 1994); but see Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449,451 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994) {upholding heightened pleading standard for 
qualified immunity cases and noting "the Court in Leatherman expressly stated it was 
not deciding whether federal courts may employ a heightened pleading standard in 
qualified immunity cases"). 
73. Local Rule 41.l(b), which states "[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of the 
local rules of this court may ... be grounds for dismissal," provides additional specific 
authority for claim-terminating sanctions. S.D. CAL. R. 41.l(b). 
74. REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note l, at 7-9. 
75. Id. 
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Rules Project relied in part on Cintron v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,76 a 
Ninth Circuit decision holding that the district court could not refuse to 
consider a proffered complaint merely because the complaint did not 
comply with technical local rules. Local Rule l.3(a), in some applica-
tions, may therefore conflict with federal law and should be amended to 
authorize outcome-altering sanctions only for appropriate rule viola-
tions.77 The district court should modify this local rule to eliminate 
this potential conflict. 
76. 813 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff in Cintron mailed his complaint 
to the district court for filing shortly before the relevant statute of limitations was to run. 
Because the plaintiff failed to include a copy of the civil cover sheet, to punch two holes 
in the top of the complaint, and to submit the correct filing fee (plaintiff submitted 
$99.00 instead of the required fee of $60.00) as required by local rules, the clerk refused 
to accept the complaint for filing and returned it to the plaintiff. Id. at 919. By the time 
plaintiff refiled the corrected complaint, the statute of limitations had expired. Id. The 
district court subsequently dismissed the action as untimely. The Court of Appeals 
reversed, and observed that local rules designed for administrative purposes should not 
be applied in a manner that defeats a litigant's access to the courts. Id. at 920. 
The Ninth Circuit has often relied on Cintron for the proposition that local rules 
merely regulate the practice of the court and should not be construed as affecting 
jurisdiction. For example, in Smith v. Frank, 923 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth 
Circuit held that the district court erred in refusing to accept plaintiff's timely filed 
objections to a magistrate judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law, where the 
ground for the refusal was that plaintiff's objections were too long, in violation of local 
rules. Id. at 142. See also Lacuna v. G-K Trucking, 877 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 
l989)(reversing dismissal where clerk refused timely filed complaint because it violated 
the local rule prohibiting use of fictional Doe defendants in pleading captions); Loya v. 
Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 721 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing dismissal based 
on clerk's refusal to file timely complaint typed on wrong size paper, in violation of the 
local rule); United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 
I 986)(reversing summary judgment where complaint, although timely filed, was rejected 
pursuant to local rule because form of summons was improper). 
77. Some applications of Local Rules l.3(a) and 41.l(b) would also appear to 
conflict with new Federal Rule 83(a)(2), which took effect on December I, I 995, and 
now provides: "A local rule imposing a requirement of form must not be enforced in 
a manner that causes a party to lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to comply with 
the requirement." FED. R. C!v. P. 83(a)(2), 161 F.R.D. 161 (1995). The purpose of 
Federal Rule 83(a)(2) is to protect against loss of rights in the enforcement of local rules 
relating to matters of form where the violation is nonwillful, but does not limit a court's 
power to impose substantive penalties upon a party for contumacious or willful viola-
tions of a local rule, even one involving merely a matter of form. See FED. R. C!v. P. 
83(a)(2) advisory committee's note. 
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3. Other Conflicts and Lapses in Clarity 
The local rules of the Southern District contain many other provisions 
that appear to conflict with the Federal Rules or federal statutes, albeit 
with varying degrees of significance.78 One such local rule arguably 
inconsistent with federal law is Local Rule 74.0(i)(6), which authorizes 
a magistrate judge to "[ c ]onduct voir dire and select petit juries for the 
court in civil cases."79 Because this delegation of authority operates 
regardless of the consent of the parties, it raises an issue of compliance 
with the Federal Magistrates Act,80 the federal statute defining the 
limits of a magistrate judge's power. Courts of appeals in at least two 
other circuits have concluded that jury selection in a civil trial is not one 
of the duties that can be delegated under the Federal Magistrates Act to 
a magistrate judge without the consent of the parties.81 Although the 
78. There are numerous other notable problems with the Southern District's local 
civil rules. For example, Local Rule I. I ( c) permits a district judge to waive the 
applicability of the local rules in a particular case and therefore may conflict with Ninth 
Circuit cases construing Federal Rule 83. See. e.g., Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 55 
F.3d 1430, 1435 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that because the district court may not 
disregard the local rules it has promulgated with respect to the right to discovery in 
disciplinary proceedings generally, it lacked the authority to dispense with discovery 
altogether in a specific case); Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 34 F.3d 731,737 (9th 
Cir. I 994)(holding that the district court's failure to comply with pretrial conference and 
trial setting time limits in local rules required reversal, that local rules have the force of 
law and are binding upon the parties and upon the court, and that a departure from local 
rules that affects substantial rights requires reversal). 
Two local CJRA rules authorize dismissal on the court's own initiative and without 
notice to the plaintiff-Local Rule 4.1 (b) for failure to file timely proof of service of the 
complaint and Local Rule 55.1 for failure to move for a default judgment within 30 
days---and therefore raise due process concerns. S.D. CAL. R. 4.l(b), 55.1. Local Rule 
45.1 requires any party not represented by counsel to submit a proposed subpoena 
accompanied by a statement of reasons and to obtain approval from the court prior to 
the issuance of a subpoena, and therefore is contrary to Federal Rule 45(a)(3) which 
requires the clerk to issue a signed but otherwise blank subpoena to any party requesting 
it. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3) with S.D. CAL. R. 45.1. Another example is Local 
Rule 7.1 which, among other things, expressly declines to follow Federal Rule 6(e) for 
motion practice and instead adopts increases in various notice periods for certain mail 
service that are inconsistent with Federal Rule 6(e). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) with 
S.D. CAL. R. 7.1. 
79. S.D. CAL. R. 74.0(1)(6). 
80. 28 u.s.c. § 636 (1994). 
81. See, e.g., Stockier v. Garratt, 974 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1992); Olympia Hotels 
Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1990). 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(3)(1994) authorizes a district court to assign to a magistrate judge "such 
additional duties" as are not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws. In Gomez 
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), the Supreme Court held that Congress did not 
intend this additional duties clause to include the vital function of jury voir dire in a 
criminal case. The Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have extended the 
Gomez rationale to civil cases and have concluded that under the Federal Magistrates 
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Ninth Circuit has not yet weighed in on this issue, the Southern District 
may find it prudent to limit Local Rule 74.0(i)(6) to those cases in which 
the parties consent to jury selection by a magistrate judge.82 
One of the more curious conflicts is in Local Rule 65.2(b), which 
governs the procedure for obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO). 
Local Rule 65 .2(b) states that "[ e ]xcept in those emergencies controlled 
by Federal Rule 65(b ), no judge of this court shall consider an applica-
tion for a temporary restraining order unless the party against whom the 
order is sought or counsel for that party is present at the time the 
application is submitted to the court."83 Federal Rule 65(b), referred 
to as an exception to the local rule's requirements, delineates the 
prerequisites and procedures for issuance of an ex parte TRO without 
notice.84 Therefore, by its exclusionary reference to Federal Rule 
65(b), Local Rule 65.2(b) does not apply to ex parte TRO applications, 
but only to TRO applications with notice. Although Federal Rule 65 
requires notice to the adverse party as a prerequisite to the issuance of 
a TRO in circumstances not governed by Federal Rule 65(b), it does not 
require that the adverse party or attorney also be actually present.85 
The additional requirement of presence at the time of a TRO application 
with notice----a requirement which invites a defendant with notice to 
defeat a TRO application by the simple expedient of not showing up--is 
therefore inconsistent with Federal Rule 65. Most likely the district 
court did not intend Local Rule 65.2(b) to mean what it says! At any 
rate, the Southern District should delete this enigmatic provision from 
the local rule. 
An illustration of a related problem is in Local Rule 7.1, a lengthy 
rule with thirty-two subsections specifying the procedural requirements 
of civil motion practice.86 Many of these specific requirements raise 
questions as to their consistency with the applicable Federal Rules.87 
Act, jury selection in a civil trial is not one of the additional supervisory duties which 
can be delegated to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) without the 
consent of the parties. E.g., Stockier, 974 F.2d at 732; Olympia Hotels, 908 F.2d at 
1368-69. 
82. See supra note 8 I. 
83. S.D. CAL. R. 65.2(b). 
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 
85. Id. 
86. S.D. CAL. R. 7.1. 
87. The Local Rules Project observed that local rules governing motion practice 
generally, such as Local Rule 7 .1, are appropriate exercises of district court supplemental 
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Perhaps aware of these possible conflicts, the Southern District, in the 
first subsection of Local Rule 7 .1, advises that the provisions of this 
local rule shall apply to motions and other requests for rulings by the 
district court "unless contrary to statute or in conflict with a provision 
of the F.R.Civ.P."88 In other words, a practitioner must follow the 
motion procedure detailed in Local Rule 7 .1 unless that procedure 
violates a Federal Rule, in which case the practitioner must ignore the 
local rule and follow the Federal Rule. Local Rule 7 .1 's disclaimer may 
respond to inconsistency concerns, but obviously places a practitioner in 
a precarious position. An attorney cannot rely on the detailed and 
comprehensive local rule for proper motion practice procedures, but must 
diligently consult the Federal Rules for contrary directions. This 
approach is confusing and inefficient. 89 The Southern District should 
rulemaking under Federal Rules 7 and 78 and should remain subject to local variation. 
See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note l, at 53-54. However, Local 
Rule 7.1 does not merely supplement the Federal Rules, it also conflicts with them in 
a few respects. For example, Local Rule 7.4(e)(4) directs the clerk not to accept a 
motion for filing unless accompanied by proof of service, a technical requirement that 
may conflict with Federal Rule 5(e) when enforced as to certain motions, such as a 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule 50 or a new trial 
motion under proposed Federal Rule 59, which are required to be filed within a specified 
time limitation (IO days after entry of judgment). See supra notes 56-58 and 
accompanying text (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e)). Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 5(e) with 
S.D. CAL. R. 7.4(e)(4). Local Rule 7.l(e)(8) directs the clerk's office not to file 
untimely motions, and thereby raises concerns of unauthorized delegation of judicial 
authority to the clerk's office. See FED. R. CIV. P. 77(c); S.D. CAL. R. 7. l(e)(8). Also, 
Local Rule 7. l ( e )( 4) increases the various motion practice time periods for up to ten 
days for certain mail service and only two days for overnight mail service, contrary to 
Federal Rule 6( e) which mandates that three days be added to a prescribed period when 
service of a motion paper is by mail. See irifra note 89. Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 6(e) 
with S.D. CAL. R. 7. l(e)(4). 
88. S.D. CAL. R. 7.l(a). 
89. Local Rule 7.l(e)(4), for example, increases the various local time limitations 
for filing motions and oppositions by mail by three days if the place of address is within 
California, by five days if outside California, and by ten days if outside the United 
States; but only by two days if service is by overnight mail. S.D. CAL. R. 7. l(e)(4). 
Local Rule 7.l(e)(4) also expressly provides that the time extension of Federal Rule 6(e) 
does not apply. Id. Federal Rule 6(e) requires the addition of three days to any 
prescribed period after service by mail, and applies to service of any notice or court 
paper. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e). Consequently, a practitioner must decide whether to incor-
porate the increased notice periods of Local Rule 7. l ( e )( 4) or the conflicting period of 
Federal Rule 6(e). And to what effect is the disclaimer in Local Rule 7.l(a)? See S.D. 
CAL. R. 7. l(a)("[U]nless contrary to statute or in conflict with a provision of the Fed. 
R. Civ. P.," the local rules shall apply to motions and other requests for rulings by the 
district court). Because Local Rule 7.1 (e)(4) is contrary to Federal Rule 6(e), does Local 
Rule 7. l(a) make Local Rule 7. l(e)(4) inapplicable? Or does the pronouncement in 
Local Rule 7. l(e)(4) that Federal Rule 6(e) is inapplicable mean that the federal rule's 
time period really is inapplicable? This local rule is, to say the least, confusing. 
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revise Local Rule 7 .1 to remove both the disclaimer and any apparent 
conflicts with federal law. 
IV. LOCAL RULES THAT DUPLICATE FEDERAL LAW 
Duplicative local rules, which one commentator charitably character-
ized as nuisances,90 present a host of related problems. Local rules that 
merely repeat provisions of the federal rules or federal statutes increase 
the volume of local rules without adding any new procedural informa-
tion. As such, they are unnecessary and in some instances misleading. 
A practitioner may (incorrectly) believe that a duplicative local rule 
repeats all the procedural guidelines of the analogous federal rule when 
in fact the local rule may repeat only selected portions. In such cir-
cumstances, the practitioner may rely on the local rule and neglect the 
federal rule in the mistaken belief that the seemingly comprehensive 
local rule provides all the necessary procedural requirements. Obviously, 
such reliance may produce unfortunate consequences for the attorney and 
for the client. 
A particularly annoying example of a duplicative local rule is one that 
does not repeat verbatim a federal rule but instead paraphrases it. A 
practitioner must carefully read such a local rule and compare it to the 
federal analogue to determine whether the local rule adds any new 
procedural information or merely repeats the requirements of the federal 
rule in slightly different language. Many of the Southern District's local 
rules applicable to criminal litigation suffer from this malady. For 
example, Local Rule 9.3, a lengthy rule consisting of approximately 
sixty paragraphs that specify the procedures applicable to writs of habeas 
corpus and post-conviction motions, mostly repeats procedural informa-
tion contained in the federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Courts and the federal Rules Governing Section 
2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts. Local Rule 9.3 
must be closely examined to ascertain the new prescriptions that actually 
90. Mary Josephine Newborn Wiggins, Globalism, Parochialism and Procedure: 
A Critical Assessment of Local Rulemaking in Bankruptcy Court, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1245, 
1255 (1995). Professor Wiggins served as the Reporter for the Ninth Circuit Judicial 
Council's Committee for the Review of Local Bankruptcy Rules. Her survey found 
widespread local bankruptcy rule proliferation within the Ninth Circuit and several 
instances where local bankruptcy rules were inconsistent with or duplicative of the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1251-57. 
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supplement, or in some instances conflict with, these comprehensive 
federal rules. 91 
The same criticism is appropriate for the Southern District's other 
criminal procedure rules.92 The fourteen lengthy and detailed local 
rules governing criminal proceedings mostly repeat the requirements of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These local rules do provide 
some specific supplemental guidelines for practitioners, but disperse 
them throughout eight pages of double-column fine print. A similar 
problem is apparent in some of the six local rules that delineate the 
duties and practices of the Southern District's magistrate judges.93 
Much of the information in these rules is set forth in the Federal 
Magistrates Act.94 Likewise, the two local rules applicable to admiralty 
claims and in rem actions duplicate provisions of the Federal Rules and 
the federal Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime 
91. Local Rule 9.3 does contain some useful supplementary infonnation such as 
the procedures for appointment of counsel, the imposition of certain notice requirements 
on the California Attorney General in death penalty cases, the assignment of petitions 
to judges, and the guidelines for various stays of execution. See S.D. CAL. R. 
9 .3( C )(2),( 4),( 6),(8), 
The apparent conflicts between Local Rule 9.3 and the federal rules are sporadic and 
subtle. For example, Local Rules 9.3(a)(4)(d) and 9.3(c)(9)(f) impose on the habeas 
petitioner the duty to timely request an evidentiary hearing, whereas Rule 8(a) of the 
Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings imposes on the court the duty to detennine 
whether an evidentiary hearing is required without the procedural prerequisite of a 
request by the petitioner. Compare R. GoVERNING SEC. 2254 PROC. IN THE U.S. DIST. 
CTS. 8(a) with S.D. CAL. R. 9.3(a)(4)(d),(c)(9)(f). 28 U.S.C. § 224l(d) authorizes venue 
either in the district where the petitioner is in custody or in which the petitioner was 
convicted, and pennits the district court "in the exercise of its discretion and in the 
furtherance of justice" to transfer to the other district. 28 U.S.C. § 224l(d)(1994). On 
the other hand, Local Rule 9.3 declares the policy of the Southern District is that "a 
petition should be heard in the district in which petitioner was convicted, rather than in 
the district of petitioner's present confinement." S.D. CAL. R. 9.3(c)(7). Other examples 
are Local Rules 9.3(b)(I) and 9.3(c)(5) which require the filing of more copies of the 
habeas corpus petitioner than does Federal Rule 3(a). Compare R. GoVERNING SEC. 
2254 PROC. IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 3(a) with S.D. CAL. R. 9.3(b)(I), (c)(5). 
92. S.D. CAL. R. 73-73. 13. 
93. S.D. CAL. R. 74-74.5. 
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994). The scheme of the Federal Magistrates Act, 
however, necessitates some local rules. The Act defines the powers of magistrate judges, 
but does not require their use unless authorized by the individual district court through 
local rules or designated by a judge in a particular case. See id. § 636(b)(l)(A),(b)(4). 
Although the Act identifies some of the specific activities magistrate judges are 
authorized to undertake, id. § 636(a),(b)(J)(2),(c), it also generally provides "[a] magis-
trate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution 
and laws of the United States." Id. § 636(b)(3). This scheme requires the Southern 
District to adopt local rules implementing the statutory authority and defining the 
additional duties of magistrate judges. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 74(a),(i), 74.1. Other 
local rules, however, unnecessarily repeat provisions of the Act when a simple statutory 
reference would suffice. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 74(d). 
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Claims (Federal Admiralty Rules), although to a lesser extent than do the 
local criminal rules. 95 
The duplication problems discussed above are also evident in the 
Southern District's civil rules. Several local civil rules reproduce 
verbatim provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 More 
prevalent are local rules that functionally repeat, paraphrase, or expressly 
incorporate analogous Federal Rules in the course of announcing sup-
plementary details and local variations.97 Although what constitutes a 
95. Local Rule 72.1, whose numerous subparts apply to admiralty and maritime 
claims, often duplicates provisions of the Federal Admiralty Rules. For example, Local 
Rule 72.1 ( e) defines the right to a hearing to contest an attachment by essentially 
repeating the content ofFederal Admiralty Rule E(4)(f). Compare FED. ADM. R. E(4)(f) 
with S.D. CAL. R. 72. l(e). Local Rule 72. l(g) is repetitive of Federal Admiralty Rules 
C(3) and C(6) in describing publication of notice. Compare FED. ADM. R. C(3) and 
C(6) with S.D. CAL. R. 72. l(g). Local Rule 72. l(h) duplicates much of Federal 
Admiralty Rules C(3) and C(6) regarding attachment of intangible property. Compare 
FED. ADM. R. C(3) and C(6) with S.D. CAL. R. 72. l(h). Although Local Rule 72.2 
duplicates parts of Federal Admiralty Rules E(2)(b) and E(4)(a)•(d) with respect to 
security and the attachment process applicable to vessels, this local rule does contain 
considerable supplemental information on the sale of arrested or attached property in an 
in rem action. Compare FED. ADM. R. E(2)(b) and E(4)(a)•(d) with S.D. CAL. R. 72.2. 
Conflicts with the Federal Admiralty Rules also occasionally occur in these local 
admiralty rules. For example, Local Rule 72.l(i)(4) requires, as a prerequisite to a de• 
fault judgment, that notice of suit be given by mail to the owner of an attached vessel, 
but only if personal service can not be done; whereas Federal Admiralty Rule B(2) does 
not require efforts to personally serve the notice as a precondition to mail service. 
Compare FED. ADM. R. B(2) with S.D. CAL. R. 72.l(i)(4). Also, Local Rule 72.2 
requires the posting of security for costs in the amount of $500 unless otherwise ordered 
in in rem actions, whereas Federal Admiralty Rule E(2)(b) appears to make the 
imposition of any such security a matter of discretion. Compare FED. ADM. R. E(2)(b) 
with S.D. CAL. R. 72.2. 
96. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. 5. l(k) (reproducing much of the language of FED. R. 
C1v. P. I0(b) in requiring pleadings with numbered paragraphs and separate statements, 
without adding any new guidelines); id. 33.1 (reproducing the numerical limitation of 
25 interrogatories contained in FED. R. Clv. P. 33(a)). 
97. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. R. l.l(c), l.2(a) (repeating much of FED. R. CIV. P. 83 
when describing the scope and availability of local rules); id. 3.2(a) (repeating the 
requirement of FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a) as to pleading jurisdiction); id. 4.l(a) (expressly 
incorporating FED. R. C1v. P. 4 and repeating the service time limitation of FED. R. Civ. 
P. 4(m)); id. 4.l(d) (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 5 and repeating portions of FED. R. 
C1v. P. 5(a)•(c) with respect to service of pleading, other than the original complaint); 
id. 5.2 (repeating parts of FED. R. Clv. P. 5(d) with respect to proof of service); id. 7.1 
(expressly incorporating FED. R. C1v. P. 6 as to computation of time); id. 23.1 (repeating 
portions of FED. R. CIV. P. 23 as to class action allegations); id. 51.1 (expressly 
incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 51 as to filing of jury instructions); id. 54.l(a) (expressly 
incorporating numerous federal rules and statutes applicable to costs and repeating 
portions of FED. R. C1v. P. 54); id. 65.2 (repeating some of FED. R. C1v. P. 65 when 
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"duplicative" local rule prohibited by amended Federal Rule 83 is 
subject to legitimate debate, under a reasonably broad construction 
substantial portions of the Southern District's civil rules on service of 
process, form of papers, proof of service, motion practice, habeas corpus 
and post-conviction motions, class actions, discovery, jury instructions, 
findings of fact, temporary restraining orders, and clerk's orders are 
suspect.98 Likewise, much of the Southern District's criminal rules 
could be eliminated, the local rules applicable to magistrate judges could 
be shortened, and the two lengthy admiralty rules could be streamlined. 
Employing such a standard of abrogation would result in local rules 
greatly reduced in quantity, perhaps by as much as one-third the volume 
of the current Southern District rules, with a corresponding increase in 
quality. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
A. The Ninth Circuit and the Southern District Should Eliminate 
Inconsistent and Duplicative Local Rules 
Local rules are a fact of federal court life. Despite the disunity they 
create, local rules are not likely to go away. As supplements to the gaps 
in the federal rules, some local district court rules are obviously 
desirable. But the Southern District, and most other district courts as 
well, must do a better job of policing its rules to remove conflicts and 
duplications. Where the conflict is due to the Southern District's 
unintentional failure to conform to amendments in the federal rules, the 
solution is fairly simple: The district court must pay closer attention to 
federal rule amendments. The Southern District surely has the resources 
to track periodic amendments to the federal rules and revise its local 
rules accordingly. There is little excuse for a district court not to have 
incorporated the 1991 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure into the 1996 version of its local rules. 
With respect to those rule conflicts that may be "intentional"--those 
where the district court knowingly departs from the federal rules without 
CJRA or Federal Rules authorization---the solution is more complicated. 
The forthcoming report of the Committee to Review Local District Rules 
should provide valuable specific recommendations to the Ninth Circuit 
Judicial Council and to the district court. But the willingness of the 
describing TRO procedures); id. 74.3 (expressly incorporating FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)); 
id. 77.2 (essentially repeating the provisions of FED. R. C1v. P. 77(c), 55(b), in de-
scribing orders grantable by the clerk). 
98. See sources cited supra note 97. 
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Judicial Council to impose local rule changes, and the degree to which 
the district court will voluntarily incorporate the Committee's recommen-
dations, remains to be seen.99 The substantial amount of effort and 
resources needed for the current Committee's review project---the first 
comprehensive review oflocal rules undertaken by the Ninth Circuit and 
one of the few such circuit reviews nationally100-makes it unlikely 
that such an effort can be sustained on an ongoing or periodic basis. 
The Committee report therefore will provide the Southern District with 
a rare opportunity to scrutinize its existing local rules based on an 
independent review. If the Southern District balks at implementing the 
report's recommendations, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council must be 
prepared to impose these recommendations through the exercise of its 
local rules oversight power. Absent a strong effort by the Judicial 
Council to directly abrogate or modify local rules that conflict with 
99. To date, district courts have shown little inclination to review and eliminate 
conflicts in their own local rules, and most circuit judicial councils have not made 
serious efforts to implement their oversight responsibilities under Federal Rule 83 and 
the Judicial Improvements Act. See Memorandum from David Pimental, Assistant 
Circuit Executive, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit to Local Rules Review 
Committee (Feb. 8, l995)(on file with author). Professor Tobias offers various 
explanations for these failures. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at 363. First, the 
circuit judges serving on the circuit council may have deferred to the district courts 
because they believed the district judges knew more about civil litigation at the trial 
court level. Id. Second, the district court judges may have been less concerned about 
reducing inconsistencies than with furthering what they believed to be the best interests 
of their own districts. Id. Third, individual district courts may have been unwilling to 
review their own rules because they were protective of their own prerogatives to adopt 
and apply local procedures and were unwilling to admit that the very rules they 
promulgated may be unnecessary or inconsistent with federal laws. Id. District judges 
serving on circuit councils may have been reluctant, out of lack of familiarity with local 
conditions elsewhere or out of professional courtesy, to critically examine the local rules 
of other districts. Id. at 363-64. Fourth, few circuit councils had the resources and 
personnel to undertake the onerous task of comprehensive local rules review. Id. at 364. 
Finally, the adoption of the CJRA in 1990 made circuit councils reluctant to scrutinize 
local rules when Congress had apparently authorized the district courts to adopt 
experimental cost and delay reduction procedures which may depart from the Federal 
Rules. Id. Likewise, individual federal district courts were too busy formulating 
experimental procedures pursuant to the CJRA's mandates to worry whether their new 
or existing local rules conformed to federal laws other than the CJRA. 
l 00. According to a survey of eleven other circuit judicial councils by David 
Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal Affairs, United States Courts for the 
Ninth Circuit, apparently only the Seventh Circuit has made serious efforts to undertake 
comprehensive and periodic review of local rules of each district within the circuit. See 
Memorandum from David Pimental, supra note 99. 
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federal laws, the recommendations of the Committee may have little 
practical effect. 
Even more daunting is the task of identifying and eliminating local 
rules that duplicate federal rules. Whatever may be the merits of the 
view that local rules should repeat or paraphrase their federal analogues, 
that approach is precluded by the 1995 amendment to Federal Rule 83. 
The weeding out of duplicative rules is essential to the Judicial Improve-
ments Act's goal of reversing the proliferation of local rules, but may 
prove difficult to accomplish. One reason is that amended Rule 83 does 
not define the term "duplicative," leaving room for legitimate debate as 
to its meaning. 101 Another is the district court's obvious predilection 
for detailed local rules which, to be comprehensive, necessarily must 
repeat federal rules. The resources required to identify and analyze 
duplicative local rules, combined with the likely resistance to rule 
pruning from the district court itself, make meaningful review of this 
aspect of local rules problematic. Nevertheless, the Southern District 
and the Judicial Council must devote the same kind of effort to the 
elimination of duplicative rules as they would to inconsistent rules. As 
with inconsistent rules, the Judicial Council must be willing to impose 
modification of duplicative local rules if the district court fails to do so. 
The Southern District should purge its local rules of all duplicative 
provisions, leaving in place only those rules which actually supplement 
the various federal rules, implement the CJRA, or opt out of the 1993 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Employing this 
standard, the Southern District could eliminate substantial portions of its 
civil, criminal, and admiralty rules. Such abrogation would result in 
local rules, greatly reduced in volume, that deal with such topics 
properly the subject of local variation. 102 
B. The Ninth Circuit Should Institutionalize the Local Rules Review 
Process 
After the Local Rules Committee has completed its work, the Ninth 
Circuit Judicial Council should institutionalize the local rules review 
10 I. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
102. The Local Rules Project has identified a number of areas where local variation 
is not only permissible but desirable. These include such topics as the general format 
of papers, in forrna pauperis, social security cases, motion practice, pretrial conferences 
and orders, appointment of guardians, assignment of cases to trial, the mechanics of trial, 
jury selection, use of masters, taxation of costs, receiverships, the duties of magistrate 
judges, court hours and sessions, duties of court personnel, use of court libraries, 
courtroom decorum and security, and admission to practice. REPORT OF THE LOCAL 
RULES COMMITTEE, supra note 1. The Local Rules Project also included several model 
local rules as part of its recommendations. Id. 
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process. In light of the amount of effort necessary to mount the current 
Committee review process, that volunteer task force approach to local 
rules review is simply too burdensome to be practical on an ongoing or 
periodic basis. In the past, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, the entity 
directed by the Judicial Improvements Act to undertake local rules 
review, has apparently lacked the resources necessary to perform this 
task. 103 But the current Committee now provides the Ninth Circuit 
with a window of opportunity to effectively institutionalize local rules 
review in the future. When the Committee submits its report and 
recommendations, the Judicial Council will be in the position to assure 
that all then-existing local rules within the Ninth Circuit are consistent 
with and not duplicative of the Federal Rules and federal statutes. 
Thereafter, as each district court within the circuit proposes new local 
rules, those proposed rules should be forwarded to the Judicial Council 
for a preadoption compliance review. The Judicial Council could assign 
this review responsibility to existing Ninth Circuit staff, or, as is the 
practice of the Seventh Circuit, may hire appropriate independent 
persons to conduct the compliance review on an as needed basis. 104 
This type of ongoing, institutionalized maintenance program would be 
far less burdensome than the periodic, comprehensive approach exem-
plified by the current volunteer task force review. The Ninth Circuit 
Judicial Council must act now to put in place the staff and resources 
necessary to implement local rule oversight on an ongoing, systematic, 
and meaningful basis. 105 
103. Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
apparently had difficulty obtaining sufficient funding for comprehensive local rules 
review as part of the Ninth Circuit's budget. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 5, at 
365. This lack of financial resources undoubtedly contributed to the Ninth Circuit 
Judicial Council's decision to delegate its local rule oversight responsibilities to the 
volunteer Committee to Review Local District Rules. 
104. See Memorandum from David Pimentel, supra note 99, at 2. The Seventh 
Circuit pays one of the law professors involved in the Local Rules Project to review all 
bankruptcy and district local rules for consistency with the national rules; her analysis 
goes to the subject court for response before consideration by the Seventh Circuit 
Judicial Council. Id. 
105. Professor Tobias recommends that the district court advisory groups and circuit 
committees created under the CJRA merge with the local rules committees and circuit 
judicial councils required by the Judicial Improvements Act and earlier legislation. 
Tobias, Improving the Acts, supra note 13, at 1628. The newer entities have already 
achieved their principal purpose-the formulation of delay and cost reduction plans---and 
the older institutions can now competently assume both the CJRA monitoring and the 
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local rules oversight responsibilities. Id. Local rules committees reconstituted in this 
manner could provide valuable assistance to district courts in reviewing existing and 
proposed local rules. Id. at I 629. 
Implementation of this recommendation would reverse the proliferation of local rules 
institutions, but may not be sufficient to curtail the proliferation of local rules 
themselves. Certainly a single, unified local advisory committee would result in a more 
efficient and better coordinated local rules revision process. Less certain is whether such 
a committee at the district court level could effectively accomplish the goals of 
eliminating inconsistent and duplicative local rules. For a variety of reasons, the district 
courts have been unwilling to critically scrutinize their own rules. See discussion supra 
note 99. With respect to inconsistent and duplicative local rules, the district courts 
traditionally have been part of the problem and not the solution. See supra notes 14-23 
and accompanying text. The abrogation of such local rules may therefore only occur if 
imposed on the district courts by the relevant circuit judicial council. 
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